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' ECtHR, Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25 May 1993 (Appl. no. 14307/88 criticism. ' Many of the concerns about this case and its progeny are about identifying exactly which practices are, in fact, sufficiently motivated by religious or other beliefs to gain protection under Article 9(1). The key characteristic of Article 9 for our purposes is the extent to which the Court has recognised a strong link between religion and democratic society. According to the Court:
freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it. 10
In this way, Article 9 will often need to be interpreted in the light of other Convention rights, such as the Article 11 right to freedom of association and peaceful assembly. " Thus, interferences with Article 9 rights may be examined not only as an impingement on the applicant's own religion or beliefs, but also as an indirect impingement on the democratic fabric of society. However, as we shall see in the next section, the relationship between religion and democracy cuts both ways. In order for a restriction upon Article 9 to be justified, it must meet the conditions specified in Article 9(2). The restriction must be prescribed by law and be necessary in a democratic society in the interest of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. These specified `interests' are more commonly referred to in the European jurisprudence as `legitimate aims'. At this stage it is important to note the approach of the other major international instruments to limiting freedom of religion. The argument below will hinge on the relationship between questions about the `legitimacy' of restrictions and questions about their `necessity', since these are distinct stages in the European system.
Article 18 of the UDHR does not contain a limitations clause but Article 29 states that:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and Likewise Article 3 of the American Declaration does not contain a limitation clause, but all of the rights enumerated by it are subject to a general limitation clause in Article 28, which states that:
The rights of man are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare and the advancement of democracy.
Both the UDHR and American Declaration thus recognise that any restriction must therefore pursue `just requirements' or `just demands' that, at least in the more specific formulation of the UDHR, are comparable to the ECHR's `legitimate aims'.
Article 18(3) ICCPR and Article 12(3) ACHR are almost identical in their formulation to Article 9(2) ECHR, so that restrictions must pursue specified legitimate aims as well as be necessary. '' The African system is slightly different in this regard. ' Article 8 ACHPR consists of only one clause, which in its second sentence contains the guarantee that, `No one may, subject to law and order, be submitted to measures restricting the exercise of [freedom of religion]'. Article 27(2), in the section of the Charter on individual duties, states that, `The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest'. The African Commission on Human Rights has held this to mean that:
The reasons for possible limitations must be founded in a legitimate state interest and the evils of limitations of rights must be strictly proportionate with and absolutely necessary for the advantages which are to be obtained. 'a In this way, the African system likewise separates the issue of `legitimate state interest' from proportionality and necessity. The `religion in transition' cases
In the case of Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova 36 the religious context was relevant both to the right at stake, Article 9, and to the reasons for restricting it. The Moldovan government argued that their refusal to register a religious association that they deemed a schismatic group within the Church of Moldova was justified because Moldova `had few strengths it could depend on to ensure its continued existence, but one factor conducive to stability was religion'.; On this basis the government argued, and the Court accepted, that `having regard to the circumstances of the case' the restriction pursued the legitimate aim of protecting public order and public safety. In Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church the European Court more explicitly accepted that the transitional context was relevant both to the `legitimacy' of the aim and to the `necessity' of the measure. 42 However, although the Court engaged directly with the arguments about the centrality of the issue for the state of Bulgaria, it failed to distinguish clearly which legitimate aim or aims were at stake, or to separate their identification from answering the questions of necessity and proportionality. 43 The Court found that: [Taking] into account the margin of appreciation . order for the margin of appreciation to operate properly it must be seen alongside the question of proportionality, which is clearly more relevant to the question of `necessity' than `legitimacy'. 53 Furthermore, and finally, it is the argument of this chapter that altering the conception of justice and thus legitimacy to be applied to transitional democracies, and condoning less than full compliance with the European Convention, would call into question the European Court's commitment to the universality of human rights.
Yet another, third, route would be to argue that although national policies founded on transitional justice have a normative pedigree, the European Court should not change its own conception of justice. It must apply its existing standards in such a way as to respond meaningfully to the factual matrix presented by cases emanating from transitional democracies without altering its general approach. The Court may check whether a transitional measure is compliant with the rule of law; that, in regard to its legitimacy, the transitional measure pursues one of the legitimate aims specified in the Convention; and, if it does, it may proceed to consider the necessity and proportionality of the measure in the transitional context via a detailed and coherent application of the margin of appreciation doctrine.
In this model the transitional context is far more relevant to the basis and width of the margin of appreciation than to the conceptual `legitimacy' of the measure. This approach is preferred since, whilst the margin of appreciation in respect of necessity allows for some modulation in the Court's jurisprudence in recognition of the transitional context (as it does in relation to the idiosyncrasies of older Contracting Parties), it does not (need to) disturb the universality human rights. ' It is tempting to think of this as a transitional margin of appreciation', or similar, but this would be misleading because it would imply that the transitional margin is different, conceptually, to the regular margin of appreciation. It is not. Instead, the European Court should apply (and sometimes has applied) its regular, even formulaic, approach to `religion in transition' cases whilst remaining fully cognisant of the conceptual relationship between domestic transitional justice policies and the international supervision of human rights protection. In order to understand this approach, it is now necessary to revisit the key cases.
Revisiting the `religion in transition' cases
The first stage in any of the transitional cases is to ensure compliance with the formal rule of law. Whether a rights-restrictive measure interferes with Article 9 rights or other Convention rights on the basis of a claimed relationship between religion and democratic stability (or susceptibility to extremism), the Respondent State must demonstrate that it is acting through law. Thus, in the Al-Nashif case introduced above, when the European Court examined whether the interference was justified, it found that the legal regime surrounding the applicant's deportation did not meet the Convention's requirement of lawfulness,;; so it did not need to examine whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim or was actually proportionate. as Article 14 or Article 3 of Protocol 1, the Court has fashioned a slightly different approach, albeit one which still carries with it an assessment of whether the aim of the measure is legitimate. As an aside, it might be noted that the Court could perhaps be a little less taciturn in its assimilation of myriad national policies to the Convention's `legitimate aims'. For the approach advocated here it is vital not to give the impression that the only reason a measure is held to be `legitimate' is that it was imposed in the transitional context. Otherwise the impression could be created that an alternative, transitional, form of justice is being applied by the European Court. Instead, the national transitional policy should be shown to correspond clearly to a Convention `legitimate aim', leaving the impact of the transitional context as a factor to be considered when assessing the means chosen to achieve the aim. Of course if the transitional policy did not correspond to a Convention legitimate aim then, whether or not it might have some stabilising effect in a fragile democracy, it would be in conflict with the Convention. By joining the Council of Europe, and signing and ratifying the ECHR, it may be that states have thereby disbarred themselves from employing some transitional policies, in favour of a `human rights based approach' to transition.
The third and most important stage is necessity. It is here where the Court can engage with the question of whether a purportedly transitional measure is widely recognised as pursuing a necessary task in the transitional process. If not then there is no reason to treat it differently to any other rights-restrictive measure when it comes to the basis or width of the margin of appreciation. This is particularly important in the religion cases since we have established that `stabilising the state around an established church', or similar, is not widely recognised as a classic transitional policy.
Where a rights-restrictive practice, which is purportedly justified by reference to the transitional context, is to be examined then the Court should, in the first place, enforce the Convention in such a way as to protect against `naked, bad faith abuse of power'. 58 However much a state stressed a special relationship between religion and democratic transition in the context of a case brought against it, a measure that amounted to an unmitigated abuse of power could never be justified. There would be no question of it falling within the state's margin of appreciation since the margin only allows variations in how, and not whether, to comply with the Convention. This is the first, but not the only, level of protection offered by the Convention. It is (only) at a second level, when a rights-restrictive transitional measure is imposed in `good faith', for example within the wider context of democratic consolidation, that the margin of appreciation should be considered. -9
The key here is that only a rights-restrictive transitional measure that contributed towards democratic consolidation could benefit from a margin of appreciation. 60 To suggest otherwise would be to radically expand the scope of the margin of appreciation doctrine, provide inadequate supervision of the new Contracting Parties' democratic transition, and undermine the rule of law. then be no better than the totalitarian regime which is to be dismantled. A democratic state based on the rule of law has sufficient means at its disposal to ensure that the cause of justice is served and the guilty are punished ...
A state based on the rule of law can also defend itself against a resurgence of the communist totalitarian threat, since it has ample means at its disposal which do not conflict with human rights and the rule of law. '
There is reason to suppose that the European Court itself is sympathetic to this approach. A point of principle can be extracted from the judgment in the Holy Synod case: that transitional societies' common need to remedy unlawful acts of the past cannot justify, in a democratic society, disproportionate state action and further unlawful acts. 62 As the Court examines the question of necessity in the transitional cases, it should encourage and scrutinise arguments about the basis and, separately, the width of the margin of appreciation. The basis of the margin may relate to the robustness of the domestic mechanisms for verifying the material facts of the case, or to the policy expertise and legitimacy of elected legislatures. The width of the margin in particular cases will be tied to some combination of various factors, including the right at stake, the way that it is invoked, and the legitimate aim the restriction pursues. 63 It is conceded that for some commentators the width of the margin of appreciation is determined too haphazardly to play the role suggested in this chapter. Nevertheless, the various factors that are identified as commonly playing a role in determining its width can, it is submitted, provide a useful framework on which to hang discussion of whether a rightsrestrictive measure in the `religion in transition' case ultimately discloses a violation of the Convention. If relevant and sufficient reasons were provided that such a rightsrestrictive measure had support from the national legislature, as an appropriate response to that state's distinctive experience of transition, this would seem to be a reasonable place to recognise a margin of appreciation within which different transitional states might defensibly come to different conclusions. 64 Naturally, however, there would still be `a European supervision'' hand in hand' with this. `" The point is not that the margin would allow states to diverge from the standards of the Convention, but that each national response to democratic transition is not expected to be identical. Thus, the approach advocated here does not demand that transitional measures per se should benefit from a wide margin of appreciation, but that the transitional context provides further data relevant to the identification of the existing rationales for its basis and width on a case by case basis.
The application of this approach to the `religion in transition' (and other transitional) cases is advantageous because there are at least two other techniques open to the European Court to respond to distinct and especially difficult issues arising in relation to the role of religion in the transitional context. These techniques, derogations and invocation of the idea of self-defending (or militant) democracy, are considered more fully elsewhere in this volume, thus the examination here will be both brief and pinned to the religious context. This is unsatisfactory from two perspectives. First, it would be too high a threshold for the rights-restrictive measure to pass, and it might result in the Contracting Party not being able to take steps that are necessary. Second, if the first problem were to be remedied by conceding a wide margin of appreciation on transitional grounds, either on the existence of an emergency situation or the necessity of the measures taken in response to it, the new Contracting Parties would be allowed to evade the scrutiny of the Court too easily and the role of Article 15 would become warped. Thus, although the possibility of a valid derogation in respect of measures on religious grounds remains, it would be in only the most serious of circumstances and could not be responsive enough to the transitional context without compromising the integrity of Article 15.
This advice is not as necessary in relation to two of the international comparators because although Article 4 ICCPR and Article 27 ACHR authorise derogations in times of public emergency, both prohibit derogation from the right to freedom of conscience and religion. The ACHPR does not contain a derogation clause at all, leading to some debate as to whether the system adequately distinguishes between peacetime limitations and derogations in times of war or other public emergency. " To the extent that a clear distinction might emerge, the suggestion here would be that derogations would be useful in `religion in transition' cases, again, only in quite extreme circumstances.
Self-defending democracy
Second, and without resorting to a derogation, a Respondent State in the European system whose democratic transition was under real threat of failure due to anti-democratic religious forces might be able to persuade the European Court to accept the notion of self-defending (or militant) democracy in order to justify rights-restrictive measures. In a series of hK See Allo, `Derogations or Limitations?
cases, the European Court has accepted that democracies whose existence is under imminent threat may take pre-emptive measures against the forces working against it, for example by dissolving political parties (albeit subject to strict scrutiny).
The case of Refah Partisi v. Turkey69 is perhaps now the most notorious of the cases on self-defending democracy. Here, the Court did not find a violation of the Convention when a major political party with around four million members, which was already part of a coalition government and which was likely to form a government after the next general election, was dissolved because of its aim of imposing Sharia law on Turkey. The Court held that a political party that was animated by the moral values imposed by a religion cannot be regarded as `intrinsically inimical' to the fundamental principles of democracy. '° However, Sharia was, bluntly, held by the Chamber and Grand Chamber to be `incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy'. '' Thus, although this case is steeped in religious contextual factors, the reason for restriction was tied to the preservation of democracy. Moreover, although it can be argued that the historical evolution of the idea of self-defending democracy suggests that it is a species of transitional justice, this does not seem to be how the European Court used it in Refah Partisi, since Turkey has been a member of `legitimacy' of the restrictive aim), it does not undermine the conceptual universality of human rights.
The approach recommended here is important because in the three principal cases examined, Al-Nashif, Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the European Court paid only lip service to the conceptual validity of domestic transitional policies when it held that the measures could be `legitimate'. On the crucial question of whether the measure was necessary, the Court largely ignored the Respondent States' arguments from a transitional perspective. On the one hand this aloofness from the realities of the new Contracting Parties could be described as `dynamics of condescension' from Western The outcome of the three cases naturally depends on both the approach to transition and to the approach of the European Court to religion. The Al-Nashif case is potentially the odd one out here since it dealt with the presumed susceptibility of one religion, Islam, to extremist influences during the transition. The Court did not strictly need to determine the veracity of this presumption in order to decide whether there had been a violation of Article 8. Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church have in common that the rightsrestrictive measure was based upon a presumed beneficial role of having a stable state church during periods of democratic transition. In its summary determination that the measure was `legitimate' the Court did not sufficiently question whether this presumption was valid either. One might even be slightly surprised by the Court's relatively easy acceptance that these measures were `legitimate': Teitel has argued that the European Court has pursued an `extreme concept of secularism' as an element of its vision of a democratic society, 86 citing Sahin v. Turkey in this regard (where the Grand Chamber upheld a prohibition upon wearing Islamic headscarves at university). The Chamber decision in Lautsi v. Italy, in which the Chamber found that displaying a crucifix in Italian schools violated the Convention rights of secular parents, seemed to follow in this line. 87 However, the decision of the Grand Chamber to reverse that finding, noted in the introduction above, certainly makes the Court's position more ambiguous. 88 Of course, since the European Court found that the measures were not necessary, the conclusion (if not all the reasoning) in both Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church would also broadly conform to the pattern seen in Sahin and Lautsi. In this way, the conclusions in Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church might owe as much to an emerging secular orthodoxy as they do to a lack of engagement with the relationship between domestic transitional justice measures and international human rights. To this extent, it is perhaps less likely that the other international mechanisms would be drawn down this route in their own `religion in transition' jurisprudence, and might even be more receptive to the broad approach outlined here (minus explicit invocation of the margin of appreciation doctrine). The relationship between an international human rights court's responses to cases from a transitional context and the universality of human rights is a fertile area of further research. One might argue that it is the universality of human rights, rather than the normative pedigree of transitional justice, which is the greatest brake on such courts' approval of national transitional policies via alterations of their own standards of justice. The extent to which the margin of appreciation in the European system really does square the circle, by responding meaningfully to the transitional context without compromising the universality of human rights, is a demanding and crucial question but, for the purposes of this chapter, it will have to remain only partially articulated. "y
